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This paper describes a model that is a first step in the use of a computer
simulation to study the  interactions among the economic and political institutions of a
society.  The economy is  a free market system, and the political system is a democracy.  In
past studies of political economy there were often only two actors:  consumer-voters and
government.  This model has been expanded so that the private sector consists of firms as
well as consumer-voters.  The government sector includes a bureaucracy as well as a
legislative body.  The user of the simulation model assigns values to key exogenous
variables representing individual preferences  and institutional arrangements in order to
explore the consequences for the behavior of firms, consumer-voters, legislators, and
bureaucrats.
The public sector of this model deals with publicly supplied goods and services.  No
other aspects of the public sector are now included, though at some  later stage in the
development of the model they may be.  A legislative body governs the society with elected
officials representing all citizens.  That is, the society is a "democracy."  The bureaucracy
is under "control" of the representatives.  The private sector is much like a free
enterprise system.  There is no specific regulation governing industry practices.
A model, which is nothing more than a simplification of reality, is  a valuable tool
of analysis.  It enables one to organize theories and empirical observations of a system,
such as a political economy, and to deduce logical implications of the relationships.  This
leads to an improved understanding of a system under study.  It helps bring into
perspective the need for detail and relevance.  A model can be useful in studying the
potential results of modifications of the system.  It is easier to manipulate the model thanthe actual political economy and the speed of analysis is much quicker then if the actual
system is used for study.  A model allows one to try several or many different scenarios
and the use of a model  to test results will be less costly than use of the actual system.
Also, it is not always ethical to make changes in the existing political economy for the sake
of experimentation.
A simulation can be defined as a symbolic model of a system which is numerically
manipulated over time.  This can be viewed as an iterative problem-solving process which
involves problem formulation,  mathematical modeling, refinement and execution of various
scenarios.  All of this is included in the devising of the model of political economy.  The
output of the simulation is  a set of system performance variables which are associated
with a set of exogenous variables that describe the system.
In  general, there are several distinct stages in a simulation  study.  The first step
is goal formulation and development of the system.  This includes specification of the
purpose and scope of the study as well as the components and the features of the model
necessary for the goals.  This step also includes synthesizing the system into a coherent
and logical structure.  Specifically, a calendar is designed and events are organized
temporally.  The second step is implementation of the model onto a digital computer.  The
third step is to check the model.  This includes verification of the model with regards to its
adequacy both in measuring  up to the original intentions for the model and checking that its
behavior does not violate "common  sense".  The model should be a sufficiently valid
mimicry of the real-world.  The final step is the analysis using the model.  This step is
concerned with  learning about the behavior of the model under different scenarios.  This
may come in the form  of sensitivity analysis or model experimentation.  A sensitivity
2analysis consists of checking the model's  responses to the changes of some significant
structural parameters.  Model experimentation would involve such things as changes in
decision rules within the system.  This step includes interpretation of the results.
MODEL ELEMENTS
The two parts, private and public, of the model of political economy each have two
basic components:  The private sector consists of citizens, who are separated into five
legislative districts, and firms.  The public sector is split between the bureau and the
legislature, which has one legislator representing each district.  There is no executive
branch of government.  Both the bureau  and the firms serve the entire society.  There is no
locational factor for firms or the bureau.  Both the firms and the bureau  may receive labor
from  all the districts.
The smallest period of time in  the model is the pay period, which is two weeks
long.  No changes in actions can take place within this period.  Adjustments  in the market
place, such as the factors of production for the firms and the bureau and the buying and
selling of private goods, occur in each pay period.  Also, income and taxes are continuously
affecting citizens.
A legislative session begins every calendar year and closes shortly before a new
fiscal year is  to begin.  Representatives serve in two legislative sessions before each
election.  Campaigns start close to the middle of the second year in a term  and run nearly a
half year, culminating in  the election itself.  Newly  elected or reelected representatives
start serving in  the following  legislative session.
3A new fiscal year marks the time legislative acts take effect.  So far this may
include the new budget of the bureau,  new tax rates, and some welfare adjustments.
Adjustments in  the wage levels are made at the start of every calendar year.  Also changes
in the price of advertising and capital due to inflation may be made  at this time.  (See the
appendix for a flow diagram of the aforementioned events.  For parameters that may be set
in a simulation also see the appendix.)
Citizens
In this "world"  there are no births or deaths.  There is no migration  into or out of
an area.  All individuals are in the work force.  There are  no differences due to age.  In
other words, people are "ageless".  Individuals are not organized within households, there
are only individuals and specified population groups based on labor class and legislative
district.  Citizens are the only consumers of the private goods in this model.  Both citizens
and firms use public goods.  As usual the consumers are assumed to be rational, i.e. they
will always choose the most preferred bundle of goods.  There are three basic components
to this assumption.  First, there exists a utility maximizing bundle.  Second, the
maximizing choice will be independent of the choice of the utility function used to represent
the preferences of the individuals.  Lastly, the optimal choice is homogenous of degree zero
in prices and income.  The model also assumes that, with appropriate selection of
parameters,  local nonsatiation exists.  Hence a utility maximizing bundle must meet the
budget constraint with equality (an interior solution).
4Citizens are grouped on the basis of labor class and legislative district.  Since
there are 3 labor classes and 5 legislative districts, there is  a total of 15 distinct groups
in the population.  Every individual is accounted for in these groups without anyone being  in
more than one group.  The same general  utility function, in this case a Cobb-Douglas,  is
used to describe each subgroup.  This is expressed as
UTILITY = ALPHA  * (QUANTPURCHASED**THETA)  * (SPROD**PHI)
* (LEISURE**PSI)
where,
QUANTPURCHASED  is the amount of privately produced goods purchased,
SPROD is amount of public goods or social welfare produced,
LEISURE  is the amount of leisure,
ALPHA is the propensity to take political action,
THETA is the preference for private goods,
PHI is the preference for public goods,
PSI is the preference for leisure.
(All variables in this equation may vary from population  group to
population group.)
A unique utility function is computed for each population group.  Any variation within
groups is assumed to be normally distributed around the mean,  where the mean is the
computed utility function and its parameters.  The preferences,  as will be seen later, may
change over time due to the effects of advertising.
Citizens buy private goods and try to sell labor.  They may be employed by either
the firm or the bureau, but they may not be employed by both at the same time.  They are
unable to switch employers  unless they are fired by the organization with which they are
currently working.  They also do not decide whether they are better off working for the
government or private industry.  As mentioned before, individuals are broken down  into
three labor classes based on productivity:  low (LOW),  middle  (MID), and top (TOP).  There
is no other differentiation based on experience or skill.  Wage scales are based on place of
5work as well as labor class.  Employees can never change work class.  However, they help
determine, in the case of the firm, how many hours they will be employed.  The number of
hours individuals will prefer to work is determined by maximizing utility (given the utility
function and budget constraint).  Hence,
HPREF =  THETA  *  (NHOURS - TIMECONTRIBUTION)
THETA + PSI  NOOFPEOPLE
PSI
THETA  + PSI
*  UNEARNEDINCOME  - TAXPAID  - CASHCONTRIBUTION
WAGE  *  NOOFPEOPLE
where,
CASHCONTRIBUTION  is the contributions in cash to political candidates,
NHOURS is the total number of hours in apay period,
NOOFPEOPLE  is the number of people in the population subgroup,
TAXPAID  is the personal income taxes paid,
TIMECONTRIBUTION  is the contributions in time to political candidates,
UNEARNEDINCOME  is the amount of welfare payments received,
WAGE  is the wage rate paid per hour.
In  the case of the bureau there is a fixed work week of 40 hours for each employee. The
bureau does not have the concept that "time  is money"  like the private sector, so there is
no attempt to get workers to work  longer in order to get things done quickly.  If work is
done in fewer then in  the 40 hours, there is no economic pressure to  reduce the number of
hours accordingly.  If a citizen chooses to work for government,  he/she will work the
number of hours offered.  Hence, the total hours worked for the bureau by citizens in a
given district and a specific labor class will be the number of hours in a full work week, in
this case 40, times the number of workers  employed by the bureau.  The total earned
income in a district's labor class is simply
EARNEDINCOME  = WAGE * HOURSWORKED
6where,
HOURSWORKED  is the total number of hours worked by everyone in the
district's labor class.
If a citizen is unemployed,  or not fully employed, he/she receives what is
essentially underemployment insurance, referred to in this model as social welfare.  This
is the compensation  needed  to raise individuals to a minimum  income level.  In the case of
those citizens already above the minimum  level there is no social welfare.  These social
welfare payments  are computed from a normal distribution with the lower portion of the
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The diagram represents a given population subgroup.  Income is on a per individual basis.
The height of the curve is the number of individuals at the given  income level.  It is
assumed that there is a sufficient number of individuals in the population so that the curve
is essentially a continuous function.  The area under the curve is the total earned  income.
In the program,  the area is estimated using the trapezoidal rule.  A simplfying assumption
used here  is that everyone earns at least something.  This is made so that the mean is at
the peak of the normal distribution.  People who are, let's say, two standard deviations or
7more below the mean have their income increased by the transfer payments  so that their
net income (both earned and unearned)  will be no lower than the minimum  mean level.  The
shaded area on the diagram is the total unearned income.  The citizens' choice of working or
not working is not affected by the existence of social welfare, but it is  a factor in the
preference for number of hours to work.
Citizens have shares in the capital and advertising firms.  The sales are received
by the stockholders as dividends.  The dividends each district's labor class receives are
RETURNS = TOTALRETURNS  *  SHARES
TOTALSHARES
where,
SHARES is the number of shares held in a districts' labor class,
TOTALRETURNS  is the total dividends paid out by these firms, and
TOTALSHARES  is the total number of shares.
Dividends are not included in the determination of welfare payments.
All earned income  and dividends are taxable.  Welfare payments are not.  Taxes
are computed on the the basis of a flat rate tax (INDRATE).  For simplicity no tax
deductions are allowed.  The tax paid in each  legislative district and labor class is
TAXPAID  =  INDRATE * (EARNEDINCOME  + RETURNS).
No tax is paid on welfare payments (UNEARNEDINCOME).
All citizens have the right to vote.  Their votes are based on the different utilities
they expect under each candidate.  ( For the formulation of this relationship see the section
on the Legislature. )  They vote for the candidate who they expect will provide the highest
utility.  If there is really not much difference between the candidates, they won't bother to
vote.  During a campaign citizens may, if they so wish,  contribute either time
(TIMECONTRIBUTION)  or money (CASHCONTRIBUTION)  to a candidate of their choosing.
8They may contribute only to a candidate in their own district.  Some may contribute both
time and money.  The politicians use these funds near the end of the campaign period.  The
expenditures of these funds, in  turn, influence citizens when they decide for whom they
will vote.  Advertising  by the firm and by the  bureau, of course, influences a citizen's
perceived gain in utility for privately and publicly produced goods.
Households are unable to store goods from  one period to the next.  In  other words,
the amount of goods purchased in one period does not directly influence the amount of goods
purchased  in  the following period.  There are, also, no intended savings in  the society.
There is no concept of a time  preference for consumption by the citizen.  As much as
possible is simply consumed in the present.  However, some income may be left over when
demand for privately produced goods exceeds that supplied.  Hence, disposable income for a
district's labor class is






LEFTOVERINCOME  is the income  left that could not be spent
in the previous pay period.
The demand of a district's labor class for privately produced goods is
QUANTDESIRED  = DISPOSABLEINCOME  / PRICE
where,
PRICE  is the price per unit of the private good.
The quantity purchased by the corresponding population group is
QUANTPURCHASED  = QUANTDESIRED  * QWT
where,
INVENTORY is the quantity of the private goods left over from the previous
period,
9QWT = 1  if total demand is less than production and inventory
= (QPROD + INVENTORY) / TOTALDEMAND  otherwise,
QPROD is the quantity produced during the pay period,
TOTALDEMAND  is the total demand for the privately produced goods.
In  this model both the firm and the bureau advertise.  The effect of advertising by
the firm on an individual is  a change in THETA.  The change is
THETAt  = THETAt..  + DECAY1  * (THETAt1. - THETAMIN)
+ADUNITS(f)*  ASYM1  * (THETAMAX  - THETAt. 1)
ADUNITS(f)  + INCR1
where,
f  indicates the firm,
t is the time index,
ADUNITS  is the amount of advertising by, in this case, the firm,
ASYM1  is the effect of the advertising by the firm,
INCR1  is the increment used with ASYM1.
The citizens' preferences  for private goods tends to decay (DECAY1)  down to THETAMIN.
The effect of advertising is limited in that THETA cannot exceed THETAMAX.  The effect of
advertising by the bureau on an individual is dealt with as a change in PHI.  The change is
PHIt =  PHIt. 1 + DECAY2  * (PHIt_1 - PHIMIN)
+ ADUNITS(b)  * ASYM2  * (PHIMAX  - PHIt.1)
ADUNITS(b)  + INCR2
where,
b indicates the bureau,
t is the time index,
ASYM2 is the effect on individuals from  advertising by the bureau,
INCR2 is the increment used with ASYM2.
The citizens' preferences  for public goods tends to decay (DECAY2)  down to PHIMIN.  The
effect of advertising is limited in  that PHI cannot exceed PHIMAX.  After PHI  and THETA are
recomputed they have to be adjusted so that
PHI + PSI + THETA  =  1 - EPSILON.
In this formulation  PSI is held constant and  EPSILON  is some small number  less than  1  such
10that the utility function has diminishing returns to scale.  In essence, individuals are forced
to reconcile tradeoffs in private and public goods.
Firms
Private industry exists as one market.  The market is competitive  in nature.
Indirect competition occurs between the private  market and publicly produced goods.  The
private market is treated as though one product is produced, but there may actually be
many different products.  However,  the production and cost functions are dealt with  as if a
universal good were produced.  Put another way, it is as if there is a "mean",  "average",
or "typical" good produced by the industry as a whole.  Firms do not purchase each others
goods.
The total cost of production faced by the industry is
COSTOFPRODUCTION  = HOURS[LOW]  * WAGES[LOW]
+ HOURS[MID]  * WAGES[MID]
+ HOURS[TOP]  * WAGES[TOP]
+ KAPITAL * KAPPRICE
+ ADUNITS  * ADPRICE
where,
HOURS is the total hours worked in a given labor class,
WAGES  is the hourly pay rate in a given labor class,
KAPPRICE  is the price of a unit of capital,
KAPITAL is the number of units of capital,
ADPRICE  is the price of a unit of advertising,
ADUNITS is the number of units of advertising.
The production function is of Cobb-Douglas form.  Specifically, it is







BETA is  an array of exponents,
SPROD is public production.
The gross revenue generated by the firms is
REVENUE  = QUANTSOLD * PRICE.
Out of the gross revenue, firms  pay a corporate  tax.  This is done by computing a normal
distribution  around the mean that is computed as  (REVENUE  - COSTOFPRODUCTION)  and the
given variance (PROFITVAR).  The tax rate (CORPRATE)  is applied on the firms making  a






The height of the curve is the number of firms at a given profit level.  Total gross profit
for the firms is the  shaded area.  The clear area shows the gross losses by firms.  The tax
is applied every pay period.  It  is not applied on a yearly basis.  This may result in too
much tax being collected, since the  losses occurred in one period can not be applied against
profits in preceding or following periods.  However, even if this results in excess taxes
being taken in, there is no refund of taxes.
Firms may contribute monetarily to a political campaign  (BRIBE)  in any of the
legislative districts.  No other kinds of contributions can be made by firms and, of course,
firms  have no power to vote in any election.  Each firm may be different in regards to
preferences to candidates for office.  A firm's decision to prefer one candidate to another
12is based on what it expects the difference in its profits to be if  one politician is elected to
office as opposed to the other one.  A  more complete discussion of firms and their campaign
contributions is made in  the legislative section of this paper.
Firms try to maximize profit.  This is  done by altering price and production.  In
this model this is  done by dealing with the "mean  firm".  If there is no inventory remaining,
the firm does not really know what the demand curve is actually like, so
PRODCHANGE  = LAMDA1  * INVTAR
PRICECHANGE  = LAMDA2  * PRICE
where,
INVTAR is the target level of inventory to be kept on hand,
LAMDA1  and LAMDA2 are adjustment factors.
If  there was no inventory in  the previous period, but there is  some in  the present period,
the firm has a little information  to perceive its demand curve so that,
PRODCHANGE  = INVTAR  - INVENTORY
PRICECHANGE  = 0.
Otherwise, the firm will try to determine the demand curve the best that it  can from  other
information  obtained in  the market.  Thus,
QSLAG  = QUANTSOLD - QSOLDLASTPP
(In  other words, QSLAG is  the change in  quantity sold between time periods.)
If QSLAG  = 0 then
PRODCHANGE  = INVTAR  -INVENTORY
PRICECHANGE  =  LAMDA3  * PRICE
(In  other words, if  there was no change in  quantity sold, bring  up the inventory to the
desired level and change the price of the product to test market reaction.)
If  QSLAG  ￿  0 then
REVCHG  = REVENUE-  REVLASTPP
QSLAG
COSTCHG  =  Cost of  QUANTSOLD  - Cost of QSOLDLASTPP
QSLAG
13PROFITCHANGE  = REVCHG - COSTCHG
PRODCHANGE  = LAMDA4  * (INVTAR  - INVENTORY)
+ LAMDA5  * PROFITCHANGE  * QSLAG * INVTAR
PROFIT
PRICECHANGE  =  ( LAMDA6  * INVTAR  - INVENTORY
INVTAR
+ LAMDA7  * PROFITCHANGE  * QSLAG ) * PRICE
PROFIT
(In  other words, if there is a change in  quantity sold, let's find out how it affected the
profit picture and then adjust production and price accordingly.  Also, bring up inventory to
the desired level.)
It is assumed when the cost change is computed that the number of advertising  units and the
price of advertising has remained constant.  At this stage of the model this is not
necessarily true for the price of advertising.  Also, it should be noted that in the short run
production capacity can not change rapidly nor can prices change rapidly in  this near zero
inflation economy.  Hence, price and production changes are limited in range.  If the price
change exceeds its limit, then
PRICECHANGE  = MAXPRICECH  * PRICE * (the sign of the price change)
where,
MAXPRICECH  is the maximum price change.
If the  production change exceeds its limit then
PRODCHANGE  =  MAXQPRODCH  * QPROD * (the sign of the
production change)
where,
MAXQPRODCH  is the maximum production change.
For purposes of simplification, when the production  level is changed, usually only
one of the input factors is changed (the only exception will be explained later).  To
determine which input factor to change, the marginal value product is computed for each
input factor.  The marginal value products are
MVP[e]  =  BETArel * PRICE * QPROD - WAGES[e]
HOURS[e]
14for each employment class (e)  and
MVP[CAPITAL]  =  BETA[CAPITAL1  * PRICE *  QPROD - KAPPRICE
KAPITAL
for capital.  If the level of production is to be raised, then the input factor with the highest
marginal value product is increased.  Conversely, if the level of production is to be
lowered, then the input factor with the lowest marginal value product is decreased.
No input factor is allowed to go below a given minimum  level.  If an  input factor
has been lowered  to the minimum,  but that  leaves the production level too high, then the
input factor with the next lowest marginal value product is decreased.  If the average
number of hours per employee in a given work class falls below 30 a week, then the firm
will fire employees.  The district from which the worker is fired is chosen randomly.  If
there is only one employee left working in a given employment class, the firm will not fire
that employee.  Also, if hiring of new employees occurs then the district from which they
come is again chosen randomly.
The employees in private industry are not unionized.  If there is no shortfall in
employment, firms test whether wage levels may be decreased by decreasing wages a
small amount.  Thus,
SHORT  = AVGHOURS[e]/PAYPERIODS
if SHORT[e]  <  0.001  then
WAGES[e]  = WAGES[e]  - PERW * WAGES[e]
where,
AVGHOURS  is the difference between total hours offered and total hours
worked per employee in a given  labor class,
PAYPERIODS  is the number of pay periods in a year,
PERW is an adjustment factor,
SHORT is the difference in the number of hours offered and the number
actually worked in each pay period per employee in a given labor
class.
15If there is a shortfall, i.e. SHORT[e]>0.001,  then a change in the wage in the employment
class will be made.  The general method can be seen  in the following diagram and equations,





DELWAGE[e]  =  SLOPE * In(SHORT[e]  + HORIZ) - VERT
if DELWAGE  > 0 then WAGES  =  WAGES + DELWAGE
where,
HORIZ is how far the curve is shifted to the left,
SLOPE is the degree of curvature of the curve,
VERT  is how far the curve is shifted up or down.
Bureau
Only one bureau, a government agency, is specified in the model.  It serves as both
administrator of social welfare and the producer of unspecified public goods.  Its costs
include labor, capital, advertising, and the social welfare roll.  The total cost faced by the
bureau is
COSTOFPRODUCTION  =  HOURS[LOW]  * WAGES[LOW]
+ HOURS[MID]  * WAGES[MID]
+ HOURS[TOP]  * WAGES[TOP]
+ KAPPRICE  * KAPITAL
+ ADPRICE  * ADUNITS
+ SWTOTAL
where,
SWTOTAL  is total social welfare payments.
16A Cobb-Douglas production function is used for the bureau.  It is






BETA  is an array of exponents for the bureau's Cobb-Douglas function.
The constraint faced by the bureau is the appropriation set by the legislature for the fiscal
year.  At the start of the fiscal year (t=1)
ACCTBt  = APPROPRIATION
where ACCTB  keeps track of the current balance left of the appropriation.  In  terms of this
model it is called the accumulated total budget.  When t  is greater than 1, then
ACCTBt  =  ACCTBt. 1 - COSTOFPRODUCTIONt
In  this model, every effort is made to keep ACCTB from going below zero.
If total expenditures need to be increased, advertising is first brought up to the
target level, PERADB  * APPROPRIATION.  If expenditures need to be increased further,
then one of the other inputs will be increased.  The expected change in output due to a given
input being increased is
DELOUT(e)  =  (BUDGETSURPLUS/  WAGES(e)
* (BETA[e]  * SPROD / HOURS[e])
DELOUT[CAPITAL]  = (BUDGETSURPLUS  / KAPPRICE)
* ( BETA[CAPITAL]  * SPROD / KAPITAL)
where,
e is the employment class ( LOW, MID, TOP),
BUDGETSURPLUS  = ACCTB(t-  COSTOFPRODUCTION(t)
24 - t
17Since it is  difficult to lay off government employees, new employees are hired only if
max (DELOUT[i])  > PERK * DELOUT[CAPITAL]  ( PERK > 1  ).
In  other words, the expected change in  output due to an increase of employment of a given
labor class must be a certain degree greater than that of an increase in  output due to an
increase of capital.  If  this condition holds, more  labor in  the class with the greatest value
for DELOUT  is  hired.  Otherwise, capital will be increased.  If new employees are hired,
they are taken from  randomly chosen districts.  Specifically, the bureau does not use the
hiring procedure in  order to influence certain legislators.
When total expenditures need to be reduced, production factors are brought down
to their minimum  level in  a set sequence, namely, (1)  capital, (2)  advertising, (3)  top wage
class, (4)  middle wage class, (5)  low wage class, and (6)  social welfare.  The order is
chosen to minimize the pain of reduction.  The bureau never looks at the productivity of the
various inputs when it has to reduce expenditures.  Before an input can be decreased the
factor preceding it must be at the minimum level.  Laborers are laid off, if it  does occur, on
a random basis in regards to the district they are from.
The bureau pays all the workers in the same employment class the same wage.
While wages  are never adjusted down, they may be  adjusted upwards on the basis of the
pay scale of the firm.  The wage paid by the bureau is  specified as,
WAGES[b,e]  =  max of (present WAGES[b,e],  PERWAGE  * WAGES[f,e])
where,
PERWAGE is a factor used to compare the firm's and bureau's wage rates,
b indicates the bureau,
f indicates the firm.
The reasoning behind this is  that the bureau would have to pay at least a  certain wage
level, as compared  to private industry, in  order to be competitive in  the  labor market.
18The bureau  spends the entire appropriation  for the fiscal year.  If there is a
surplus at the end of a fiscal year, the bureau again brings advertising up to the target
level.  If there is still a surplus, the bureau spends it on capital stock.  Never is
employment increased in the final period of the fiscal year.
The bureau submits an appropriation  request at the start of a legislative session.
The bureau will always want to have a higher funding level, but realizes that if it asks for
too much  it's request may not be taken seriously.  Therefore,  what the bureau would like to
receive is
COSTOFBUDGETINCREASE  = (1  + X * PERAPP)
*(APPROPRIATIONt  - APPROPRIATIONt_1)
where,
X is a random number between 0 and 1,
PERAPP is the maximum percentage  increase that would be requested
by the bureau,
t is the present time period.
This means that the bureau  asks for an increase that is between the point that lies on  the
trend line of the two previous requests and some maximum  increase that the bureau is
willing to ask for.
The bureau  makes  no adjustment in its expenditures in the current fiscal year
based on knowledge of appropriations in the coming fiscal year.  If the bureau were to
recognize that it would be getting an increase, it could afford to use any surplus in its
budget at the end of the fiscal year to change the mix of inputs more in favor of labor.
Also, as the model  now stands, any budget surplus is spent on  capital in the last period.  A
surplus is not spent on advertising, if advertising is already at the target level,  nor is it
19spent on labor.  None of the budget surplus in the last pay period is saved as a hedge against
the possibility of an increase in  welfare payments.
Legislature
Two  major events occur for the legislature.  They are the  legislative session and
the election.  During the legislative session the legislature decides on the size of
government expenditures and the level of taxation.  However,  as previously stated, the
bureau actually controls the day to day expenditures.  The bureau is the only organization
that has any control over what to spend money on and when to spend it.  The legislative
decision on the appropriation  is in part influenced by the bureau.  Each representative is
affected by the amount of government spending in his/her respective districts.
One representative  is elected from  each of the five districts in  this society.  Each
one comes up for  reelection  at the same time every two years.  Each  incumbent faces one
and only one opponent during an election period.  There are  nine possible political positions
(NPLAT=1,2,...,9) that can be taken by a politician (see figure  1).  These  positions contain
three factors:  size of appropriation, the individual tax rate, and the corporate tax rate.
In  figure 1,  the horizontal axis is the individual tax rate, and the vertical axis is the
corporate  tax rate,  and the  lines running from  the vertical axis to the horizontal axis are
the different levels of appropriation.  The levels increase as they move out away from the
origin.
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Figure  1
The budget proposal chosen by a politician is simply,
SPLAT  = a * ( APPROPRIATION  + DEFICIT)
where,
a is 1 if the level of spending is unchanged  (NPLAT=1,5,9),
(1+PERLEVEL)  if the level of spending is increased (NPLAT=2,3,4),
(1-PERLEVEL)  if the level of spending is decreased (NPLAT=6,7,8),
PERLEVEL  is  a fixed ratio less than 1,
APPROPRIATION  is the current budget,
DEFICIT  is the deficit from  the previous fiscal year.
Only one of these levels of spending is permitted to be taken by any politician.  However, as
will be seen later, the actual value of the appropriation levels will change over time.
The rate of taxation of the individual chosen by a politician, in the case of a
constant appropriation (NPLAT=1,5,9), is simply
NPLAT  = 1,  RIPLAT  = INDRATE
NPLAT  = 5,  RIPLAT  =  INDRATE
(1  -BASEF/C)*CORPRATE*PERRATE
NPLAT  = 9,  RIPLAT  =  INDRATE
(1  +BASEF/C)*CORPRATE*PERRATE
21where,
BASEF is the net profits of the firms (before taxes),
C is the appropriation  level,
CORPRATE is the corporate tax rate,
INDRATE  is the individual income tax rate,
PERRATE  is the percent change possible in tax rates,
RIPLAT is the politician's platform position on the individual tax rate.
In the case of a proposed increase in the spending level, the RIPLAT values for
NPLAT=1,5,9 are multiplied by 1+PERLEVEL  to get the values of RIPLAT for NPLAT=3,4,2,
respectively.  In  the case of a proposed decrease in spending, the RIPLAT values for
NPLAT=1,5,9 are multiplied by 1-PERLEVEL to get the values for NPLAT=7,6,8,
respectively.
The taxation rate chosen for private industry, in the case of a proposed unchanged
appropriation  level, is simply,
NPLAT  =  1,  RFPLAT  = CORPRATE
NPLAT  = 5,  RFPLAT  =  CORPRATE
(1  -BASEF/C)*CORPRATE*PERRATE
NPLAT  = 9,  RFPLAT  =  CORPRATE
(1+BASEF/C)*CORPRATE*PERRATE
where,
RFPLAT is the politician's platform  position on the corporate tax rate.
Like the individual tax rate proposals, when the appropriation is proposed to be increased,
then  RFPLAT for NPLAT=2,3,4 are 1  +PERLEVEL that of NPLAT=9,1,5, respectively.  For a
reduced spending level RFPLAT for NPLAT=6,7,8 is 1-PERLEVEL  that of NPLAT=5,1,9,
respectively.
During a campaign,  individuals compare  the two candidates in their district.  For
each candidate a utility is determined.  Again, the utility is determined in terms of a
population mean.  In  the case of the incumbent, perceived utility is given by,
UTILINCUMBENT  = IRHO(i) * ( EXPECT[PROMISE]  * UINC1
+ EXPECT[SAME]  * UINC2)
22where,
UINC1  = CDUFN(NEWQ(i),  PROPSPROD(i),  AVLES),
UINC2  = CDUFN(weighted  average of QUANTPURCHASED  over
the last 12 months, SPROD, AVLES)
CDUFN(a,b,c)  = ALPHA()  * (a**THETA(j))*  (b**PHI())  * (c**PSI(j))
PROPSPROD  is the proposed SPROD level,
NEWQ  = (1-INDRATE)*(EARNEDINCOME+DIVIDENDS)+UNEARNEDINCOME
PRICE
AVLES  is the weighted average of leisure over the last 12 months,
i indicates the incumbent's position,
IRHO is the effect of advertising (at the start of a campaign  IRHO=1),
EXPECT  is the expectation of either UINC1  or UINC2 occurring
(EXPECT[SAME]+EXPECT[PROMISE]=1).
Essentially, UTILINCUMBENT  is the weighted average between what he/she is promised by
the incumbent and what has been the case over the past year.  For the opponent, the
perceived utility is
UTILOPPONENT  = IRHO(o) * CDUFN(NEWQ(o),  PROPSPROD(o),  AVLES)
where,
o indicates the opponent's position.
The average citizen's perception of the impact of the election on his/her utility, therefore,
is,
DELUTILITY  = UTILINCUMBENT-  UTILOPPONENT.
Individuals may contribute either money or time to a campaign.  The first step in
this process is to determine the percentage of a given population that contributes to either
the opponent or the incumbent.  This is done by calculating Z-statisitics and then,  using a
standard normal distribution, finding the percent.  This can be seen in the following
diagram.
ZN  0  ZP
23where,
ZP  =  (CONTRIBTHRESH  - (DELUTILITY  / UTILINCUMBENT))  / VARDEL,
ZN  =  (-CONTRIBTHRESH  - (DELUTILITY  / UTILINCUMBENT))  / VARDEL,
CONTRIBTHRESH  is the contribution threshold,
VARDEL is the variance of DELUTILITY.
For cash contributions it is first treated as if all will contribute.  The typical
individual is analyzed in terms of the difference in utility, the quantity of cash available,
and their political responsiveness.  In  terms of the model this is,
mean  = [ IDELUTILITYJ  * QUANTPURCHASED  * PRICE ] * K1
UTILITY  NOOFPEOPLE  * THETA
where,
K1  is the political responsiveness.
mean
The shaded area,  in the above diagram,  is  the contribution to the candidate.
CASHCONTRIBUTION  =  CASH  * P * NOOFPEOPLE
where,
CASH is the shaded  area in the above diagram,
P is the percent making contributions.
The contribution of time  is handled in a similar manner with
mean  =  [DELUTILITY*  LEISURE ]  K1
UTILITY  PHI
and
TIMECONTRIBUTION  =  TIME * P * NOOFPEOPLE
Firms may also contribute money to a campaign.  This is accomplished by having
the "mean"  firm look at each district, one at a time.  The profits expected, if a candidate
wins, are computed such that,
24PROFWINC  = (EXPECT[SAME]  * (1-CORPRATE)
+ EXPECT[PROMISE]  * (1  - RFPLAT(i)))
* INCOMEFACTOR
PROFWOPP  = (1  - RFPLAT(o))  * INCOMEFACTOR
where,
INCOMEFACTOR  is weighted average of profits over the last four quarters,
PROFWINC  is the expected profit if the incumbent should win,
PROFWOPP is the expected profit if the opponent should win.
The difference between the expected profit with the incumbent and the expected profit with
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With this mean and given the standard deviations of this distribution, the points 'a'  and 'b' in
the above diagram are computed.  These points are equi-distant from zero and indicate
those firms significantly affected by who is elected.  These firms contribute monetarily to
the preferred  candidate.  In the area to the right of 'b' firms will contribute a percentage of
the expected difference in profits to the incumbent.  A percentage of the area to the left of
'a' will be the firms' contribution to the opponent.  It should be noted that the diagram  is an
example.  The point where the difference is zero could be anywhere.  Hence, it is
conceivable that more firms would prefer the opponent than the incumbent,  unlike the
preferences shown in the example above.  It is even possible that all firms would prefer
only one of the candidates.
25The contributions affect individuals by changing their perception of the candidates.
This is represented for a  candidate by
RHO  =  1  + GAMMA[1]  * In(CASHFUND+1)
+ GAMMA[2]  * In(TIMEFUND+1)
+ GAMMA[3]  * In(CASHFUND+1)  * In(TIMEFUND+1)
where,
CASHFUND is the cash contributed to a  particular candidate,
GAMMA is a  vector of weights, and
TIMEFUND  is  the time contributed to a  particular candidate.
The election is  set for the end of the campaign period.  Votes are determined by






The points 'a' and 'b'  are computed from the mean and standard deviations.  They
are also equi-distant from zero.  The number of people to the right of 'b' are counted.
These are the voters for the incumbent.  The number of people to the left of 'a'  are those
voting for the opponent.  Those between  the two points are not voting because they are
indifferent to the two candidates.  It  should be noted that individuals are voting only  in  one
election, that is,  there are no other elected offices being voted on.  Hence, it is  assumed
here that if  they are essentially indifferent to the two candidates, they will not vote.
Though it is  not explicitly stated in  the model, there is  some cost incurred by individuals
when they go to vote.
26There  are two legislative sessions in a term for an elected representative.  During
each legislative session, the appropriation for the bureau is determined as well as the tax
rates that will be applied on individuals and firms.  A legislator's position on the
government spending level is based on three factors:  the amount of government spending
in the legislator's district, the time until the next election, and the level of spending
(SPLAT) promised  by the legislator.
The  bureau  relates to a legislator by the level of government spending relative to
the total income in the  legislator's district.  The bureau's authority is,
BUREAUAUTHORITY[d]  =  DIFIGURES[d.UI]  + DIFIGURES[d.BI]
DIFIGURES[d,TI]
where,
d is the legislative district,
DIFIGURES[d,UI]  is the total social welfare payments in the
district (UNEARNEDINCOME),
DIFIGURES[d,TI] is the total income from all sources in the
district,
DIFIGURES[d,BI  is the total earned income of bureau employees
in  the district.
In other words, the dependency of a district's economy on government spending is  a
measure of bureau authority, which is represented  by a number between 0 and 1.
The nearness of an election (TUE) will affect a politician's stand on a particular
appropriation  during a legislative session.  The assumption is that the closer the election,
the more a representative will respond to the desire of being reelected.
The change in the level of government  spending a legislator will prefer is,
CHANGEFUNDINGLEVEL[d]  = APPROPRIATIONt - (SPLAT(d) - DEFICIT)
where,
d indicates the legislative district,
t indicates the present time period,
DEFICIT  is the last deficit.
27This desired change in funding is thus tempered by the bureau's authority and the time of
the election.  The new position on the budget by the legislator is,
COSTSOCIALBUDGET[d]  =  CHANGEFUNDINGLEVEL[d]
+ BUREAUAUTHORITY[d]  * TUE / (24 * NYEARS)
* (COSTOFBUDGETINCREASE
-CHANGEFUNDINGLEVEL[d])
where NYEARS  is the number of years between elections.
In  order to have any appropriation come out of the legislature, a coalition must be
formed to pass the bill.  The method chosen for this model is that of the stable coalition.  A
stable coalition is actually the closest majority group that can be found.  A majority  group,
in this case, is the number needed to pass the appropriation.  The closest majority group is
a majority that differs the least from each others appropriation level proposals as
compared with  all other possible majority groups.  The number needed to pass the
appropriation bill is
NUMBERFORMAJORITY  = NDIST * PERCENTMAJORITY  + 1
where the operation is performed by integer arithmetic and,
NDIST is the number of districts,
PERCENTMAJORITY  is  the percent that defines the majority rule used.
The closest NUMBERFORMAJORITY  legislators form the stable majority.  Only these
legislators are used to determine the final appropriation figure.
The power of each legislator in the majority group is computed by the form,
PPOWER[d]  = TENURE[d]  / TENSUM
where,
TENURE[d]  is the number of terms served by this legislator,
TENSUM  is the total number of terms served by all of the
legislators combined.
28The new appropriation is determined  on the weighted average, based on seniority
of the  legislators in the voting block, values of COSTSOCIALBUDGET.  Thus,
CHANGEINAPPROPRIATION  = SUMPSCB / SUMP
where,
SUMPCSB  is the sum of PPOWER[ds]  * COSTSOCIALBUDGET[ds]
SUMP  is the sum of PPOWER[ds]
ds indicates the districts in the stable coalition.
Therefore, the amount appropriated for the bureau is
APPROPRIATIONt+1 = APPROPRIATIONt  + CHANGEINAPPROPRIATION.
After the appropriation is passed, the legislative session starts to come to a
close.  However, first the  legislature sets new tax rates which will raise enough revenue
to cover the  appropriation plus any deficit (DEFICIT)  due to a shortfall in taxes from the
fiscal year that is coming to a close.  The tax rate for individuals comes  up before the
corporate tax rate comes up in  the legislative session.  Therefore the tax rate for
individuals chosen by a legislator is
PR  =  NEED  * RIPLAT(d'
OLDBASEITOT  * RIPLAT(d) + OLDBASEFTOT  * RFPLAT(d)
where,
NEED  = APPROPRIATIONt+1 + DEFICIT
OLDBASEITOT  is the total individual income in the previous fiscal year,
OLDBASEFTOT  is the total firm net profit in the previous fiscal year.
However, since the tax rate is not allowed to change too rapidly, a legislator is not allowed
to be more than a level off his/her previous stand on the tax rate.  Therefore,  if PR >  .99 *
PERRATE * RIPLAT(d) then PR equals that same  maximum change.
Like the decision on appropriations, the decision on the new individual tax rate
(NEWRI)  is by a stable coalition.  After the change in individual tax rate the new corporate
tax rate is simply
29NEWRF  =  NEED  - OLDBASITOT  * NEWRI
OLDBASFTOT
unless NEWRF >  MAXRF,  in which case NEWRF  = MAXRF.
The government could be run perpetually in deficit.  There is no mechanism now
that would force a balanced budget.  The legislature can approve an appropriation that far
exceeds anything it is able to collect in taxes.  The way the model operates now, the
legislature first votes for a given appropriation and then it will try to raise the necessary
funds by changing the tax rates.  The government will never try to  raise a surplus.  A
surplus could occur only because of chance changes in the market place.
After the legislative session ends, the representatives' stands are tempered by
the outcome of the session.  This is performed by keeping the nine point scheme (figure 1)
still centered on point 1. Hence, if the bills that pass stay at position 1,  case 1,  then there
is  no change of any of the position stands.  However,  if the situation is now at point 2,
case 2, this then becomes the point 1. The representatives at point 1  are at the new point
6,  those at 2 will  now be at 1, 2, 3, or 9; those at 3 or 4 may now be at 4 or 5; those at
5, 6, 7 are now at 6 and those at 8 or 9 may now be at either 7 or 8. It follows then that
other shifts in majority result in the following:
Case 3
1-->7,  2-->2 or 9,  3-->1  or 3, 4-->4 or 5,
5-->6,  6-->6, 7-->7, 8-->8, 9-->8
Case 4
1-->8, 2-->2 or 9,  3-->2 or 9, 4-->1  or 3 or 4 or 5,
5-->6 or 7, 6-->6 or 7, 7-->8,  9-->8
Case 5
1-->9,  2-->2, 3-->2, 4-->3 or 4,  5-->1  or 5,
6-->6 or 7, 7-->6, 8-->8, 9-->9
30Case 6
1-->2,  2-->2, 3-->2, 4-->3 or 4, 5-->3 or 4,
6-->1  or 5 or 6 or 7, 7-->8 or 9,  8-->8 or 9, 9-->2
Case 7
1-->3, 2-->2, 3-->3, 4-->4,  5-->6, 6-->5 or 6,
7-->1  or 7, 8-->8 or 9, 9-->2
Case 8
1-->4, 2-->2 or 3, 3-->4, 4-->4, 5-->4,  6-->5 or 6,
7-->5 or 6, 8-->1  or 7 or 8 or 9, 9-->2 or 3
Case 9
1-->5, 2-->2 or 3, 3-->4, 4-->4, 5-->5,  6-->6,
7-->6, 8-->7 or 8, 9-->1 or 9
In  other words, each legislator remains with basically the same proposed levels of funding
and taxing even though the majority opinion may be shifting.
Conclusion
This paper has documented a first-stage  model of a political economy.  The model
is based on an "American"  type of market place economy as well as government in the role
of delivering goods and services.  The model has been formulated in a manner that is
sufficiently simple while being explicit enough to allow its development as a computer
simulation program.
The model is flexible enough  to test different scenarios.  For instance, how the
length of time of events or the sequence of events impact on the choice of government
policy.  The manner in which the length of term of a legislator effects the legislator's
responsiveness to his/her constinuents could be explored through simulations.
31A number of directions exist in which this model could move.  One is that of
education.  It may be quite useful as a tool in  the development of understanding how
government interacts with economies.  The model would help people to think in terms of
interrelationships instead of isolated situations.  It may give an understanding of events
that may not be as easily explained by other means.  Several levels of the program could be
used for various educational purposes.
With further development the model could potentially be used to gain insight into
actual issues of current concern.  For example, the model could be used to study laws that
govern bureaucracies.  Potentially, the shortfalls of a present system could be studied.
Comparative studies of possible alternatives to a present bureaucractic structure could be
made.  For another example, part of this model might be adapted to a simulation program
that simulates regional economies.  Such an addition would help show the political and
economic effects of different development scenarios.  Any economic development affects
the local political environment, and conversely, any change of the political situation will
change the direction of economic development.
In general, this model will help test theories on relationships between  political life
and economic life.  It can show not only what happens, but how and why as well.  In  the case
of specific problems, this model could lead to a more optimal solution being chosen.  It also
may be  used to suggest what conditions need be present for some possible policy outcomes
to occur.
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34APPENDICESFlow of Events
In  a simulation there is a specific sequence of events, not all of which occur in
each time period.  The basic time period is the semi-monthly  pay period.  The flow diagram
on the next pages describes this sequence of events.  The definitions used in the flow
diagram are the following:
ADJUSTINMARKETPLACE  make adjustments  in the market place.
CHANGETAXANDAPP  new appropriation and tax rates take effect.
CHANGEWAGES  new wage contracts are negotiated and take effect.
CHGSWEL  cost of living increase in welfare payments.
CLOSESESSION  determine tax rates.
ELECTION  election.
FIRMCONTRIBUTES  firms determine contributions to political campaigns.
INDCONTRIBUTE  individuals determine and make contributions to political
campaigns.
LEGISLATIVESESSION  determine  appropriation level.
PP  time counter  (pay periods).
PRICEADJUSTMENTS  inflation effect on capital and advertising.
STARTCAMPAIGN  candidates and platforms are chosen.
SPENDCONTRIBUTIONS  candidates spend contributions.
The significant time periods are the following:
Campaign season  Runs for 3 1/2 months.
Election  Occurs every 2 years (default value).
Fiscal year  Starts at halfway point in the calendar year.
Legislative session  Starts at the beginning of each calendar year.  Runs for
5 months.
Pay period  24 pay periods per year.  Two pay periods per month.
A1PP=1
New calendar  P  yes  PRICEADJUSTMENTS
I  year  ?  I  -----  CHANGEWAGES
no
\/
New fiscal  yes  \  CHANGETAXANDAPP
Iyear  ?  I-----  CHGSWEL
no
ADJUSTINMARKETPLACE
Start  of  legislative  yes
session  ?  >I  LEGISLATIVESESSION
session  ?  )  - >  CLOSESESSION
no
A2no
Campaign  yes  A  |  FIRMCONTRIBUTES
period  ?  7  NDCONTRIBUTE
no
CEndof  yes  )  SPENDCONTRIBUTIONS
campaign  ?
no
Election  es  ELECTION
no
PP  =  PP  +  1
A3
A3  COTIBTCitizen  Parameter  Definitions and Criteria  For Setting
ALPHA  Propensity to take political action.
ASYM1  Effect of advertising  for private goods.
ASYM2  Effect of advertising for publicly supplied goods.
HOURSWORKED  Total hours worked  for bureau in pay period preceding start of the simulation (80 hours per person is full-time).
CONTRIBTHRESH  Fraction UTILINCUMBENT  is different from UTILOPPONENT.
(0OCONTRIBTHRESH<1)
DECAY1  Decay in value of THETA (lessening desire for private goods). (Value of DECAY1  is negative.)
EPSILON  THETA  + PHI + PSI = 1 - EPSILON
Indicates diminishing returns to scale in the utility function if 0<EPSILON<1  (computed by the program).
EXPECT  Probability of getting the same or the promise of the incumbent.
[SAME]  The same as before.  (0.0sEXPECT[SAME]<1.0)
[PROMISE]  The promise (computed in the program  from the equation
EXPECT[PROMISE]  = 1.0-  EXPECT[SAME]).
FHOURSWORKED  Total hours worked for the firms in  the pay period preceding start of the simulation  (80 hours per person  is full-time).
INCR1  Increment used with ASYM1.
INCR2  Increment used with ASYM2.
K1  Political responsiveness (0<K1  <1).
NOOFPEOPLE  Number of citizens in a district of a given wage class.
PHI  Preference for publicly supplied goods.  (0<PHI<1).
PHIMAX  Maximum value PHI may be.  (O0PHIMAXs1)
PHIMIN  Minimum  value PHI may be.  (0<PHIMIN<1  and PHIMAX>PHIMIN)
B1PSI  Preference for leisure time.  (O<PSI<1)
SDCASH  Standard deviation of cash contributions.
SDINC  Standard deviation of earned income.
SDTIME  Standard deviation of time contributions.
SDUTIL  Standard deviation of utility.
SHARES  Number of shares owned by citizens. (O<SHARES<N  and total number of
shares does not exceed N)
THETA  Preference for private goods.  (O<THETA<1)
THETAMAX  Maximum value THETA may be.  (O<THETAMAX<1)
Also THETAMAX  + PHIMIN + PSI =  1 - EPSILON  (which is computed  by
the program).
THETAMIN  Minimum  value THETA  may be.  (O<THETAMIN<1  and
THETAMAX>THETAMIN)  Also THETAMIN  + PHIMAX + PSI = 1- EPSILON
(which is computed by the program).
VARDEL  Variance of the difference in perceived utilities between opponent and
incumbent.
B2Firm  Parameter  Definitions and Criteria for Setting
ADUNITS  Number of units of advertising used by the firms at the start of the
simulation.
BETA  Array of exponents for the firms' joint  Cobb-Douglas production
function.  They remain  constant throughout the simulation.  (Best if
chosen so that MVP's would be approximately equal.)  [BASE,  LO,
MID, TOP, CAPITAL, SWEL]
BRIBETHRESHOLD  Percent difference between profits expected under incumbent and
under opponent that is the threshold level in deciding to contribute to
a political campaign.
COFPLASTPP  Cost of production during pay period preceding that for
COSTOFPRODUCTION  (where cost of production is computed with the
initial values of hours, capital, advertising).
DIFPROFITSD  Standard deviation of difference between  incumbent and opponent in
profits.
EMPDIST[District]  Number of employees by wage class and district.
EXPECT  Probability of getting the same or the promise of the incumbent.
[SAME]  The same as before.
[PROMISE]  The promise (computed in program from  EXPECT[PROMISE]  =
1 - EXPECT[SAME]).
HOURS
[LO]  Number of hours worked  in pay period for firm (low wage class).
[MID]  Number of hours worked in pay period for firm  (middle wage class).
[TOP]  Number of hours worked in pay period for firm  (top wage class).
INITIALPRICECHANGE  Percent price change in first pay period of simulation  run.
( 0<INITIALPRICECHANGE<  0.01)
INVENTORY  The inventory currently held by the firms.
KAPITAL  Number of units of capital used in pay period.
C1LAMDA1  Used for production and adjustment when  inventory has gone to zero.
(1  LAMDA1 <2)
LAMDA2  Price adjustment when inventory has gone to zero.  (0<LAMDA2<1)
LAMDA3  Price adjustment  if quantity sold is not changing. (LAMDA3>0  with
LAMDA3  recommended  less than 0.2)
LAMDA4  Parameter  for using inventory in calculation of production change.
(LAMDA4>0)
LAMDA5  Parameter for using change in  profit in calculation of production
change.  (LAMDA5>0)
LAMDA6  Parameter for using inventory in calculation of price change.
(LAMDA6>0)
LAMDA7  Parameter for using change in profit  in calculation of price change.
(LAMDA7>0)
MAXPRICECH  Maximum fractional change in price of private good from one period
to the next.  (MAXPRICECH>0  with MAXPRICECH  recommended to be
less than 1)
MAXQPRODCH  Maximum  percent change  in quantity of private goods produced from
one period to the next.
NOOFFIRMS  Total  number of firms.
OFFERED*
[LO]  Number of hours offered by the firms to the low wage class.
[MID]  Number of hours offered by the firms to the middle  wage class.
[TOP]  Number of hours offered by the firms to the top wage class.
PERB  Fraction of the difference between  profits expected under incumbent
and profits expected if the opponent were to be elected to office that
will be used for campaign contributions.  (0<PERB<1)
PERPI  Fraction  change in price level while using percent change in profit to
adjust price.  (0<PERPI<1)
PERSAL  Fixed fraction of actual sales that the firms try to maintain in
inventory.  (0<PERSAL<1)
C2PERW  Adjustment used to lower wages if  firms get all the labor they had
wanted (i.e.  helps determine if  wage too high).  (O<PERW<1)
PRICE  Per unit price of the private good.
PROFITSD  Standard deviation of profits.
QPRODLASTPP  Quantity produced during pay period preceding that for QPROD.
QUANTSOLD  Quantity of private goods sold in the current pay period.
WAGES
[LO]  Wage offered by the firms for low skill workers.
[MID]  Wage offered by the firms for middle  skill workers.
[TOP]  Wage offered by the firms for top skill workers.
*  These variables are  initialized with the values of the pay period preceding the first one in
the simulation run.
C3Bureau  Parameter  Definitions and  Criteria For Setting
ACCTB  What is left of appropriation (simulation  begins in the middle of a fiscal
year).
ADUNITS  Number of units of advertising used by the bureau  at start of the
simulation.
ADMIN  Minimum  number of units of advertising needed per pay period.
APPROPRIATION  Appropriation for fiscal year during which simulation starts.
BETA  Array of exponents for the bureau's  Cobb-Douglas production function.
They remain constant throughout the simulation.  (Best if chosen so that
the MVP's would be approximately equal.) [BASE,  LO, MID, TOP,
CAPITAL, SWEL]
DEFICIT  Deficit from  the previous fiscal year.
EMPDIST[District]  Number of employees by wage class and by district.
HRSMIN
[LO]  Minimum  number of hours needed per pay period of low skill labor.
[MID]  Minimum  number of hours needed per pay period of middle skill labor.
[TOP]  Minimum number of hours needed per pay period of top skill labor.
KAPITAL  Number of units of capital used by the bureau at the start of the
simulation.
KAPMIN  Minimum number of units of capital needed per pay period.
LASTAPPROP  Appropriation  for fiscal year preceding the current one.
PERADB  Maximum fraction of the bureau's budget that can be spent on
advertising.  (0 <  PERADB  <  1)
SWMIN  Minimum amount of social welfare in a pay period.
WAGES
[LO]  Wage offered by the bureau for low skill workers.
[MID]  Wage offered by the bureau for middle skill workers.
[TOP]  Wage offered by the bureau for top skill workers.
D1Politicians' Parameter  Definitions and Criteria For Setting
GAMMA  Weights used to determine
[0]  effect of cash and time
[1]  contributions to campaign.
[2]
NPLAT  Platform  of the politician.  (NPLAT =1 ... 9)
RHO  Influence from campaigning.
RFPLAT  Proposed corporate tax rate.  (0.0 < RFPLAT < MAXRF)
RIPLAT  Proposed individual tax rate.  (0.0 < RIPLAT < MAXRI)
SPLAT  Budget proposal.
TENURE  Number of terms in office.  (TENURE  1)
E1Miscellaneous Parameter  Definitions and Criteria for Setting
ADINFLATION  Inflation in price of advertising (1 plus factor of increase).
Example: 2 percent inflation implies ADINFLATION  would be 1.02.
ADPRICE  Price per unit of advertising.
CORPRATE  Tax rate on firms' profits.  (0.0<CORPRATE<MAXRF)
FISCPP  Counter to keep track of which pay period it is within fiscal year.
Initial value  is set internally by the program.
HORIZ  Shifts the curve, in the  relationship between labor shortage - wage
rate change, to the left.  (O.O<HORIZ<1.0)
INDRATE  Personal income tax rate.  (0.O<NDRATE<MAXRI)
KAPINFLATION  Inflation in price of capital ( 1 plus factor of increase).
Example:  2 percent inflation implies KAPINFLATION  would be 1.02.
KAPPRICE  Price per unit of capital.
MAXRF  Maximum  tax rate on firms' profits.  (0.0<MAXRF<1.0)
MAXRI  Maximum  personal income tax rate.  (0.0<MAXRI<1.0)
NEWBASEFTOT  Current account of profits before taxes and campaign contributions
during a fiscal year.
NEWBASEITOT  Current account of total earned income and dividends citizens have
received during fiscal year.
NPAYPERIODS  Number of pay periods in a term.  (At this time it can only be 48.)
NTERMS  Number of terms in the simulation run (this variable is set by the user
at the beginning of every run).
NYEARS  Number of years in a legislature's term.
OLDBASEITOT  Total current income and dividends citizens have received during the
last fiscal year.
F1OLDBASEFTOT  Total profits before taxes and campaign contributions during the last
fiscal year.
PERAPP  Maximum  percent increase in budget the bureau would ask for.
Example:  5 percent increase implies PERAPP  would be 1.05.
PERCENTMAJORITY  Percent of votes required to pass legislation.
(0.5<PERCENTMAJORITY_<1.0)
PERK  One criteria used by the bureau to decide on hiring additional labor.
Example:  if 5 percent greater, then PERK  would be 1.05.
PERLEVEL  Change  in level of government  spending possible.  (0<PERLEVEL  and
most likely less than 1).
Example:  for an increase of 10 percent PERLEVEL would be 0.1.
PERRATE  Percent change possible in level of tax rates.
Example:  for a 2 percent change,  PERRATE=0.02.
PERWAGE  The minimum  percentage of the firms' wage rate that employees of the
bureau  are paid.
Example:  if 90 percent, then PERWAGE  would be 0.90.
SLOPE  Changes rate of increasing wage when shortfall in labor occurs.
(0<SLOPE<1)
SLPSW  Used to calculate tradeoff between  earned income (excluding dividends)
and social welfare.  (suggest SLPSW>1)
TYBASFTOT  Current account for corporation  tax collected during a fiscal year.
TYBASITOT  Current account for individual income tax collected during a fiscal
year.
VERT  Moves curve,  in labor shortage - wage rate diagram, up or down.
Affects both how much shortage there is before increasing the wage
and the rate at which to increase wages.
F2Computer Adaption of Model
This model of  the political economy was programmed on a Control Data Cyber 172.  It
was written in the PASCAL language and is approximately 4900 lines long.  It is broken
into  131  procedures and functions.  The program  is designed for interactive use.  The
parameters described in  the previous sections may be set by a user or can take default
values.  Additional information  about the program or the model can be supplied upon
request.
G1